Egalitarian and elitist education systems as the basis for international differences in wage inequality by Klaus Wälde
European Journal of Political Economy
. Vol. 16 2000 445–468
Egalitarian and elitist education systems as the




Department of Economics, UniÍersity of Dortmund, 44221 Dortmund, Germany
Received 1 November 1998; received in revised form 1 April 1999; accepted 1 July 1999
Abstract
This paper investigates one reason why some countries have experienced a strong
increase in wage inequality over the last decades while others have not. The explanation is
based on the link between the quality of education and induced technological change. A
country with qualitatively better-educated skilled workers, relative to unskilled workers, has
a higher ratio of human capital to labour than a country where the quality of education is
more equal across education levels. These differences lead to different paths of induced
technological change across countries, which in turn imply different histories of the
distribution of labour income. q2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: O33; D33; H52
Keywords: Quality of education; Elitist and egalitarian education systems; Biased technological
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1. Introduction
A comparison between the evolution of wages in the US and European
countries, for example, Germany, makes one think that differences in education
systems might be one of the fundamental reason why the US has experienced a
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considerable increase in wage inequality during the 1980s while Germany has not.
One of the advantages that is often claimed for the German education system is
the homogeneity in the quality of education across education levels. Leaving
school after 9 years and successfully finishing vocational training leads to accumu-
lation of a marketable stock of human capital that is a little smaller than human
capital of someone with a university degree.
While it is difficult to define and measure the quality of education, one reason
for relative quality differences across education levels might lie in the allocation of
. educational resources as teachers and equipment . Some figures from OECD
. 1993, p. 92 are suggestive of significant cross-country differences: comparing
. total public and private expenditure for education per education level between
. the US and Germany converted by using PPPs shows that in 1991 expenditure
per student for primary and secondary education was about the same in the US and
. Germany US$5555 for the US and US$5432 for Germany . Expenditure per
student in tertiary education, however, was more than twice as much in the US
. than in Germany US$13639 for the US and US$6322 for Germany . If expendi-
ture were corrected for GDP per capita, Germany would have an even higher
expenditure ratio for primary and secondary education than the US and a still
smaller ratio for tertiary education than the US. These differences in the relative
allocation of resources might be one of the reasons for differences in relative
abilities of graduates.
2
Direct evidence that differences in abilities between graduates from tertiary
education and graduates from primary and secondary education are larger in the
. US than elsewhere comes from analyses of the OECD 1995 ‘‘International Adult
.  . Literacy Survey’’ by Nickell and Bell 1996 . Indirect residual evidence is
. provided by Blau and Kahn 1997 . Both Blau and Kahn and Nickell and Bell note
that, roughly, German unskilled earn more than American unskilled workers but
do not have a higher probability of becoming unemployed. As Nickell and Bell
. 1996, p. 306, their emphasis put it, ‘‘German men in the bottom wage decile
earn more than twice as much as American men in a similar position. And yet,
they are hardly more likely to be unemployed.’’ Blau and Kahn argue that this
finding can be explained to some extent by a larger public sector in Germany that
acts as an ‘‘employer of last resort’’. At the same time, however, they stress that
differences in the size of the public sector are not enough to account for all of the
differences. They therefore conjecture that productivity of unskilled workers in
Germany exceeds productivity of unskilled workers in the US. Nickell and Bell
give support for their view that ‘‘the German education system produces a much
2 There is remarkable disagreement in the literature on the question to which extent more resources
. increase future labour market success of pupils. Card and Krueger 1992, 1996 hold a positive view
. while Betts 1996 is more sceptical. A broader overview of the literature can be found in Burtless
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more compressed distribution of human capital than the systems in Britain or the
.  . United States’’ p. 306 by citing the OECD 1995 study, which found that the
variation in literacy levels is much larger in the US than in Germany.
In the model set out in this paper, education systems are classified as egalitarian
or elitist. ‘Elitist education system’ could be understood as a system where
differences in the quality of education are large within one level of education. This
idea would characterize an education system where the quality of, for example,
universities differs greatly. Few universities bring together the best teachers and
the best equipment to educate the best students. The term ‘elitist education system’
is used here in another sense: an education system is more elitist than another
education system, if — generally speaking — the quality of education in tertiary
education is considered to be more important than the quality of education on the
primary and secondary level. Following the formal definition that follows below,
an education system is more elitist, if the skill ratio of graduates from tertiary to
graduates from primary and secondary education is higher than in another educa-
tion system.
With the above evidence as background, this paper starts from the hypothesis
that the US is a country with a more elitist education system than Germany. Given
well-known differences in the evolution of relative labour earnings between these
. two countries Abraham and Houseman, 1995; Steiner and Wagner, 1998 , one is
inclined to ask: what is the impact of the relative quality of education systems on
absolute and relative wages of different education groups?
The main findings of the subsequent analysis are the following: differences in
education systems, per se, do not have a direct impact on the skill premium. An
elitist education system does not lead to higher wage inequality than an egalitarian
system, provided that individuals have unconstrained access to education levels.
Differences in education systems, however, do have efficiency effects. When an
education system is inefficient, incentives to develop new technologies arise that
tend to reduce these inefficiencies. Once these technologies are available, this
inefficiency is reduced but at the same time the wage structure changes. While the
introduction of new technologies in an economy with an elitist education system
leads to an increase of wage inequality, new technologies in an economy with an
egalitarian education system lead to a decrease of wage inequality.
Two aspects of new technologies are stressed in this paper. First, modern
technologies allow skilled workers to do the jobs formerly performed by unskilled
and; second, skilled workers perform these ‘unskilled jobs’ with the same produc-
tivity with which they perform ‘skilled jobs’. Abilities acquired during education
that were traditionally useful only for performing skilled jobs are now of use also
when performing unskilled jobs. When modern technologies are available, firms
have to decide by which technology to produce. This is equivalent to asking,
‘‘Who should perform unskilled jobs?’’ When a firm opts for modern technology,
unskilled jobs are performed by skilled workers. When it stays with traditional
technology, unskilled jobs continue to be performed by unskilled workers. Since() K. WalderEuropean Journal of Political Economy 16 2000 445–468 ¨ 448
modern technologies allow skilled workers to preserve their productivity lead
skilled perform unskilled jobs with technologies that differ from technologies
. used by unskilled , firms not only compare relative wages, but also relative
productivity. The direction of technological change is therefore determined by
relative wages per efficiency unit. Since efficiency units depend on the education
system, the education system plays a crucial role in determining the direction of
technological change.
It is then immediately clear that technological change is endogenous and that,
just as unskilled workers can be replaced by skilled workers, the effect can be the
other way round. Technological change can either increase demand for unskilled
or for skilled workers, depending on relative productivities. Relative wage income
is fixed by free access to all education levels. An elitist education system that
leads to a high ratio of abilities of skilled as compared to unskilled workers
thereby implies low relative wages per efficiency unit of skilled workers. This
creates incentives to develop technologies that allow the replacement of unskilled
by skilled workers. The opposite holds true for an economy with an egalitarian
education system. In between lies an education system where no incentives exist to
create new technologies.
3 As will turn out below, this is the efficient, i.e., output
maximizing education system.
Now, assume a new technology has been developed and firms start replacing
unskilled workers by skilled workers. This leads to an increase in efficiency, an
increase in wages of skilled workers and a decrease in wages of unskilled workers,
measured in terms of the consumption good. Technological change, as understood
here, produces winners and losers. While demand for certain abilities increase, and
these abilities become more valuable, other abilities lose value.
4
The entire argument hinges on the assumption that modern high-skill technol-
ogy allows skilled workers to keep their productivity lead relative to unskilled
workers when performing unskilled jobs. If workers were equally productive,
modern high-skill technologies would never be adopted and wage inequality
would not rise. However, this assumption is plausible. If technologies allow
skilled workers to keep their productivity lead, these technologies will be adopted
by firms. Hence, there are incentives to develop these technologies, and one
should expect that they are indeed developed.
3 This paper focuses on the distributional aspect of technological change. Incentives to develop new
technologies that raise productivity of all factors of production can be expected to be always present.
4 The Hicks–Kennedy–Von Weizsacker approach to distributional aspects of technological change ¨
does not allow to understand both replacement and loss in value. The main references are Kennedy
. . . . 1964 , Samuelson 1965 , Drandakis and Phelps 1966 and von Weizsacker 1966 . The lacking ¨
. microfoundation has been criticized by Nordhaus 1973 . An improvement is provided by Binswanger
. . . 1974 and an overview is in Binswanger and Ruttan 1978 . See Walde 1997 for a more detailed ¨
critique of this literature.() K. WalderEuropean Journal of Political Economy 16 2000 445–468 ¨ 449
These findings allow to understand several aspects of the literature. The
 evolution of wages in the US over the 1980s e.g., Bound and Johnson, 1992; Katz
. and Murphy, 1992; Juhn et al., 1993 can be understood as an endogenous
outcome of technology choice induced by the relative quality of education. These
authors argue that technological change must have been one of the reasons why
wage inequality increased. This conclusion can, however, be disputed. There are
theoretical arguments that suggest that technological change should reduce wage
inequality. The present model presents a way to reconcile these opposing views.
The paper also provides an answer to the question why wage inequality did not
increase in other countries, as shown, for example, for Germany by Abraham and
. . Houseman 1995 and Steiner and Wagner 1998 . Finally, the paper provides an
interpretation of relative unemployment experience in US and Germany. These
aspects are taken up in Section 5 below.
. In previous literature, Zeira 1998 has analysed the effects of technology
adoption on the growth rate of a country. He shows that a small difference in the
 productivity parameter of a country’s technology such as land abundance and
. quality, natural resources or climate can lead to high differences in GDP per
capita. Below a certain threshold level, a country will not adopt new technologies
and will therefore not grow, whereas countries above this level do grow. As here,
technology adoption in his framework depends on relative prices. However, he
does not focus on replacing labour groups by each other, and, therefore, does not
 draw a link to the education system. Neither does he explicitly despite a short
. section on income distribution study the effect of new technologies on relative
wages or differences between the US and Germany.
. Lindbeck and Snower 1996 present a model where the allocation of workers
to jobs can change. They assume a production function that allows firms to
organize production processes such that workers perform one specific task
.  . Tayloristic organization or perform several tasks holistic organization . Within
this framework, an interpretation of labour-market inequality is given as a shift
from Tayloristic to holistic organization of firms. This shift is caused by, among
other factors, increasing complementarities between jobs and improvements in
human capital that make workers more mobile between different jobs. These
changes are viewed as exogenous.
. Acemoglu 1998 shows that a high proportion of skilled workers encourages
high-skill biased technological change. An increase in the number of skilled
workers can therefore lead to an increase of the skill-premium. This can poten-
tially explain the increase in wage inequality in the US. An alternative mechanism
. based on the composition of jobs is developed by Acemoglu 1996 . He shows that
changes in the composition of the labour force or a change in relative productivity
. biased technological change can move an economy from one type of equilibrium
behaviour of firms to another. This means that, for example, a rise in the number
of skilled workers can change the composition of jobs from all jobs, being
identical, to some high-capital and some low-capital jobs. This leads to an increase() K. WalderEuropean Journal of Political Economy 16 2000 445–468 ¨ 450
of wages of skilled and a decrease of wages of unskilled workers despite the
increase of the share of skilled workers.
This paper extends this literature. The model presented here links the effects of
technological change on wages to the schooling system. It explicitly studies the
incentives to develop technologies that increase demand for unskilled or skilled
workers. The consequence is a precise hypothesis that allows a comparison
between labour market performance of different countries: the design of an
education system leads to country-specific paths of technology development and
adoption, which implies country-specific labour market outcomes.
5
2. Modelling technological change and the relative quality of education
Consider an economy with three factors of production, skilled and unskilled
workers, and physical capital. Skilled workers supply human capital and earn high
.  per-period labour income, unskilled workers supply labour and earn low per-
. period labour income. Technological change is modelled by considering the
effects of the introduction of a modern technology in an economy where one
traditional technology is under use.
The relative quality of education is captured by a skill ratio b, which represents
the number of efficiency units supplied by an unskilled worker relative to the
number of efficiency units of a skilled worker when both are working with the
traditional technology. The skill ratio b between unskilled and skilled workers is
. to a large extent determined by the education system. One can expect that this
ratio is lower, the less a country values education of those who work as unskilled
workers relative to education of those that work as skilled workers. The ratio b
can therefore be used to characterize cross-country differences in educational
policy. We will talk about an egalitarian education system when b is higher than
some threshold level t and about an elitist education system when b-t. This
threshold level will be defined and determined as the efficient skill ratio between
skilled and unskilled workers. As observed in the introduction, the skill ratio b of
.  unskilled graduates from primary and secondary education to skilled graduates
. from tertiary education is higher in Germany than in the US.
The traditional technology is given by a simple version of a CES production
function, where all distribution parameters have been set to 1r3 and the productiv-
ity parameter has been normalized to unity. The allocation of capital to the
5 . An interesting cross-country perspective is taken by Acemoglu and Pischke 1999 , they view
differences in changes in wage inequality as partly caused by differences in on-the-job training
received by different skill groups.() K. WalderEuropean Journal of Political Economy 16 2000 445–468 ¨ 451
traditional technology is given by K
tr, the number of skilled is denoted by N
tr, the H
number of unskilled using this technology is N
tr. The technology is L
1ru uu u tr tr tr tr Y s K q N q bN , u-1. 1 .  . . . / HL
. y 1 The elasticity of substitution is given by «s 1yu and the embodied abilities
of unskilled b convert the number of unskilled into efficiency units of labour.
Abilities of skilled workers have been normalized to unity, since focusing on
relative skill differences is sufficient to capture the central aspects of embodied
skills acquired during education and induced technological change.
Modern technologies can be either high-skill or low-skill. Consider first the
introduction of modern high-skill technology, the type of technological change that
will turn out to be more relevant from an empirical point of view. The introduction
of such a technology leads to a replacement of unskilled workers in the production
process by skilled workers. Before introducing high-skill technologies formally, let
us consider an example of what high-skill technologies might be. Imagine a
production line in the automobile industry and let it be schematically represented
. as in Fig. 1. The upper half 1a and 1b shows production processes before and the
. lower half 2a and 2b after high-skill-biased technological change. Assume the
production of a vehicle involves, among other things, assembling the car body
with the chassis. When only the traditional technology is available, this task is
performed by, say, four unskilled who use a certain amount of tools or machines.
. Every unskilled worker does one out of these four tasks. This is process 1a . The
task of skilled consists in coordinating the four tasks involved in the assembling
. process itself and in coordinating the assembling process with other processes 1b
as, for example, enamelling. Technological change then means that the car body is
no longer put on the chassis manually piece by piece, but with the help of industry
robots. Instead of four unskilled workers doing mainly manual work, one skilled
worker is left, who operates the new production unit. This modern technology is
. . represented by 2a . The technology for enamelling remains unchanged 2b .
Fig. 1. Introducing high-skill technologies.() K. WalderEuropean Journal of Political Economy 16 2000 445–468 ¨ 452
. Formally, such a modern technology can differ from the traditional technol-
. ogy 1 in many respects, such as distribution parameters, the elasticity of
substitution or the overall productivity level. In the present example, only differ-
ences in factor input and embodied productivity differentials of different factors of
production will be considered. The high-skill technology is
1ru uu u mm m m Y s K q N q N .2 .  . .. HH / 01
. . Two aspects make technology 2 a different technology from technology 1 .
First, unskilled workers are replaced in the production process by skilled workers.
Second, skilled workers keep their embodied productivity lead when performing
traditionally unskilled jobs.
When modern technology is available, firms can produce a good with two
. technologies. When they use the traditional technology 1 , unskilled jobs are
. performed by unskilled workers. When they use modern technology 2 , unskilled
jobs are performed by skilled workers. Hence, one efficiency unit supplied by
skilled workers is a perfect substitute for one efficiency unit supplied by unskilled
workers. On the second point, modern technology allows to make productive use
of abilities of skilled workers also for performing traditionally unskilled jobs.
These abilities were traditionally useful only for performing skilled jobs. If a
skilled worker replaces an unskilled worker, when only the traditional technology
is available, it would not be clear if the productivity of a skilled worker would be
much higher than the productivity of an unskilled worker. Returning to the
example above, a skilled worker is trained for coordination activities, and not for
manual work in assembling pieces of a car body. Hence, his or her productivity
would be more or less the same, if not less, than that of an unskilled worker. The
reason for supposing that these abilities are now also useful for performing
unskilled jobs stems from the underlying idea of R&D. When firms think about
. developing new technologies, they take the ability distribution represented by b
in the workforce as given. There are gains to be had from a new technology, if this
technology allows for profitable use of these abilities when also performing
unskilled tasks. Firms will therefore tend to develop technologies that permit an
expansion of the range of applicability of these abilities.
New technologies do not necessarily replace unskilled workers by skilled
workers. The direction that technological change takes is endogenously determined
through economic incentives. In principle, relative demand for skilled workers can
. rise or fall. The alternative to the modern high-skill technology 2 is a modern
low-skill technology that allows replacement of skilled workers by unskilled
workers. This takes the form
1ru uu u mm m m Y s K q b N q b N .3 .  . . . LL / 01
Here, as well, workers keep their productivity when moving between jobs. An
unskilled worker who now performs traditionally skilled jobs keeps productivity() K. WalderEuropean Journal of Political Economy 16 2000 445–468 ¨ 453
 .  . . b . Which of these two technologies technologies 2 or 3 will be adopted is an
endogenous decision and will be studied below.
Introducing high-skill technologies has different implications for the capital
intensity per job than introducing low-skill technologies. Let ‘automation’ denote a
process where new technologies permit production of the same amount of output
with fewer workers, but with higher capital intensity. This term can then be used
as a short form for ‘introducing the modern high-skill technology’ since, as will be
seen in Section 4, the introduction of low-skill technologies does not imply that
new technologies are characterized by a higher capital intensity than old technolo-
gies.
3. The framework of analysis
The effects of automation are analysed in an overlapping generations frame-
work. Individuals live for two periods and decide the occupation they want to
work in at the beginning of the first period. They can either start working
immediately or obtain education for one period and then work in the second period
only. Those who start working immediately are the unskilled, the others are the
skilled workers. We only study two periods in this paper. The present section
. looks at a steady state of an economy that uses the traditional technology 1 only.
This will be called the original equilibrium and will be assumed to prevail in t.
. Section 4 looks at period tq1, where the modern technology 2 is introduced.
The effects of new technologies will be derived by comparing these two points in
time.
3.1. The original equilibrium and school quality
The criterion for choosing between working or studying is expected lifetime
income. As long as lifetime income of a skilled worker is higher than lifetime
income of an unskilled worker, individuals will opt for education and become
skilled. In equilibrium, lifetime income of both groups is identical and in a steady
state,
y1 y1 w q 1qrw s 1 q rw .4 . .  . LLH
The sum of discounted labour earnings w of an unskilled equals the present value L
of lifetime income of a skilled worker. The latter has labour earnings w in the H
second period, with the first period spent studying. Under free mobility of capital,
the interest rate r is determined in international capital markets. For simplicity,
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Taking the production side into consideration allows us to determine the
relative supply of skilled and unskilled workers. It is useful to determine relative
supply of human capital and labour rather than relative supply of skilled and
unskilled workers. Human capital is supplied by skilled workers and is given by
HsN .6 a . H
Labour is supplied by unskilled workers and equals the product of the number of
unskilled and productivity of this group b,
LsbN .6 b . L
 tr .1r« Marginal productivities of human capital and labour are given by Y s Y rH H
 tr .1r« and Y s Y rL . The inverse relative labour demand curve is then L
1r« 1r« YL w L HH y 1 s m s b , / / YH w H LL
where the equality of wages and value marginal products, w sY and w sbY , HH L L
is used.
Combining supply and demand gives the equilibrium ratio of labour to human
capital as a function of the skill ratio b,
L «
s 2qr b .7 .  . .
H
Specifying how many individuals are born and die in every period would allow us
. to determine absolute and not only relative quantities. This, however, is of no
. importance for the results in this paper and is omitted. As can be seen from 7 , a
. country with a more elitist education system a lower b has a higher human
. capital to labour ratio where these quantities are measured in efficiency units
than a country with a more egalitarian system. In terms of the introductory
example, the US is human capital richer than Germany.
3.2. IncentiÍes to deÍelop a modern technology
There are incentives to develop a modern technology, as long as the introduc-
tion of a new technology allows production at lower unit costs. The unit cost
. function of the traditional technology 1 is given by
. 1 r 1 y « 1 y « 1 y « tr 1y« y1 cr , w , ws r q w q bw .8 .  .  . . / HL H L
. For the modern high-skill technology 2 , the equivalent function is
. 1 r 1 y « 1 y « 1 y « m1 y « cr , w , ws r q w q w .9  . . .  . . HH H H
Unit costs of the high-skill technology are therefore lower than unit costs of the
traditional technology if
c
m r,w ,w -c
tr r,w ,w mw -b
y1w m 2qr b-1, 10 . .  .  . HH HL H L() K. WalderEuropean Journal of Political Economy 16 2000 445–468 ¨ 455
. where the last step follows from inserting 5 . R&D for the modern technology
will therefore take place, and it will be adopted as soon as developed, if wages per
efficiency unit of skilled workers, w , are smaller than wages per efficiency unit H
of unskilled workers, b
y1w . Since relative wage income is fixed by the occupa- L
. tional choice 5 , the modern high-skill technology will be developed if the
productivity advantage of skilled compared to unskilled workers is high enough,
i.e., if b is sufficiently small. In other words, there are incentives to develop
modern high-skill technologies only if the quality of primary and secondary
education is sufficiently low or the quality of tertiary education is sufficiently
high.
.  . If the condition in 10 holds with equality, i.e., if 2qr bs1, there would be
. no incentives to develop new technologies. If the LHS of 10 is strictly greater
. than unity, i.e., if 2qr b)1, there are incentives to develop modern low-skill
. 6 technologies of type 3 , which allow replacement of skilled by unskilled workers.
Hence, technological change can take two directions: It can be either low-skill
labour saving or high-skill labour saving. The direction it takes is determined by
relative wages, which in turn depend on differences in embodied skills. The
direction of technological change is therefore endogenously determined.
The relative quality of education has this crucial impact on the direction of
technological change for two reasons. First, the productivity differential b be-
tween unskilled and skilled workers is preserved under modern technologies.
Second, technologies permit replacement of factors of production. If modern
technologies only allowed replacement, i.e., if productivity differences b were
occupation specific and hence disembodied, adopting the modern high-skill tech-
nology would never be profitable, and there would only be incentives to develop
the modern low-skill technology. When both types of worker have the same
. productivity b in performing unskilled jobs, a comparison of unit costs as in 10
shows that it is profitable to replace unskilled by skilled workers only if w -w . HL
. This never holds in the original equilibrium, given the education decision 5 . As
stressed above, the assumption that modern high-skill technologies allow skilled
workers to preserve their productivity advantage is based on the observation that it
is precisely these higher embodied abilities of skilled workers that provide the
R&D incentives to develop technologies that allow replacement of unskilled by
skilled workers. These abilities are required ‘‘anyway’’ for performing the skilled
job, they are ‘‘already there’’, so there are gains from using these abilities more
intensively, i.e., from using them also in other occupations.
If factors of production could not be substituted, introducing a new technology
would not imply any change compared to the original equilibrium. There, when
. only the traditional technology 1 is available, skilled and unskilled workers do
6 . This can be easily seen by performing the same steps as in 10 for the modern low-skill
technology.() K. WalderEuropean Journal of Political Economy 16 2000 445–468 ¨ 456
not directly compete for jobs. Technological constraints prevent unskilled from
performing jobs of skilled workers and skilled workers would not want to work as
unskilled, due to lower wage income they would earn. Productivity differentials b
. . therefore do not play a direct role. When modern technologies 2 and 3 are
available, skilled and unskilled workers can be employed in both skilled and
unskilled jobs. They are now perfect substitutes and the productivity differential b
has a direct impact on relative demand. When b is high, unskilled workers replace
skilled, when it is low, skilled workers replace unskilled.
7
4. The impact of automation
This section studies the economy when the introduction of the modern high-skill
technology comes as a surprise to economic agents, i.e., after education decisions
of workers who are young in tq1 have been taken, and before new workers enter
the labour market. As a consequence, the factor endowment of the economy does
not change compared to the original equilibrium. This assumption reflects slower
supply reactions than changes in technologies.
8
4.1. Factor allocation between technologies
. We will now assume that inequality 10 holds and that the new technology has
been developed. In this case, firms start to replace the traditional technology by
the modern one. This process increases demand for skilled workers, which raises
their labour earnings. The process comes to a halt when unit costs are the same for
. both technologies. By 10 , wages per efficiency unit are then equalized in the new
equilibrium,
wt q 1 s b
y 1 wt q 1. 1 1 . .  . HL
The effect of the new technology on relative wages can directly be seen by
. comparing this latter equation with relative wages in the original equilibrium 5 ,
i.e., before the introduction of the modern technology. Firms using the modern
7 This result is not driven by an assumption that one factor of production must completely replace
another factor of production. If firms could choose the number of workers of each type for the
. unskilled job, i.e., if the modern high-skill technology 2 was of the form
1ru uu u mm m m m Y s K q N q b N q N , .. . HL H . 01 1
m . firms would find it profitable to set N to zero. This directly follows from 10 . L1 8 We therefore do not study a long-run steady state, but the effects of the introduction of a new
. technology in an economy that was in a steady state the original equilibrium of Section 3 . In a longer
perspective, where the steady state with the new technology would be studied, the ratio of the number
of skilled to unskilled changes after the introduction of a new technology. When the modern high-skill
. technology is introduced, this ratio rises Walde, 1997 . ¨() K. WalderEuropean Journal of Political Economy 16 2000 445–468 ¨ 457
. technology 2 will be called modern firms. Some firms will continue to produce
. with the traditional technology 1 , as labour can work in traditional firms only
and full employment prevails given wage flexibility.
To simplify notation, factor inputs will be measured in efficiency units,
. . following 6a and 6b . Production functions are then
1ru uu u tr tr tr tr Y s K q H q L ,1 2 .. .  . /
1 r u uu u mm m m Y s K q H q H .1 3 .  . .. . 01




mm H s H s H y L . 14b .  . 01 2
This shows that the amount of human capital allocated to modern firms is
independent of the stock of capital in the economy as a whole. It does, however,
depend on the type of capital, since only the modern technology allows replace-
ment of unskilled by skilled workers. The allocation of physical capital to modern
and traditional firms directly follows from the allocation of human capital and
labour. We have
K
tr K s2L , 15a .
H q L
K
m K s H y L . 15b .  .
H q L
. The expression Kr HqL is the ratio of the economy’s capital stock to the sum
of the economy’s endowment with human capital and labour. Call this expression
the capital richness of the economy. This expression is multiplied by the allocation
of labour and human capital to both technologies. The allocation of human capital
. tr and labour to the traditional technology is, by 14a , H qLs2L. The allocation
of human capital to the modern technology is H
mqH
msHyL. The capital 12
stock per technology is therefore proportional to the sum of the allocation of
human capital and labour to this technology. In other words: the capital richness
per technology is identical to the capital richness of the economy.




. .  . rium factor allocations into 12 and 13 gives cf. Appendix
1ru u agg u 1yu Y s K q2 HqL .1 6 .  . .
The major change in the aggregate technology from the original equilibrium,
. where only the traditional technology 1 was available, is that human capital and() K. WalderEuropean Journal of Political Economy 16 2000 445–468 ¨ 458
labour are now perfect substitutes. This, of course, is the consequence of the
technology used by modern firms, where human capital can perform the same
tasks as labour does in traditional firms. The immediate consequence is clear:
Wages of unskilled workers were an increasing function of productivity of their
skilled colleagues in the original equilibrium. Wages of unskilled fall in the new
equilibrium, the higher the stock of human capital, i.e., the more skilled individu-
als there are or the higher their productivity.
4.2. Efficiency, capital intensity and wages
Technological change increases efficiency. Both the introduction of the modern
high-skill and the introduction of the modern low-skill technology, whichever is
profitable, lead to an increase in output per capita. This finding is proven for
automation.
. Proposition 1. Automation and efficiency Automation increases output per
agg . tr . capita, Y r N qN )Y r N qN . HL HL
Proof. In order to show that automation incre ases output per capita, it is sufficient
to show that automation increases output since the population size is constant.
 u uu . 1 r u Given technologies of the type Ys K qH qL as used here, output is
maximized, holding capital K constant, when the stock of human capital equals
the stock of labour, HsL. This equality, however, does not generally hold, as the
. equilibrium ratio of labour to human capital 7 shows. The modern high-skill
technology ‘‘removes the border between jobs’’ and allows human capital to flow
into unskilled jobs. This leads to an equalization of the amounts of factors of
production in efficiency units in both occupations, and in both technologies as
. . shown by 14a with 14b . Since this is the output maximizing factor allocation,
automation results in increases in output if, under the traditional technology, the
stock of human capital is higher than the stock of labour. I
. Corollary. Efficiency in education and new technologies Efficient education
systems proÍide zero incentiÍes to substitute between factors of production.
Proof. An education system is defined to be efficient when the skill ratio of
graduates b is such that output per capita is maximized. Output per capita in the
 . . original equilibrium i.e., where only the traditional technology 1 is available is
. maximized when HsL. By the equilibrium ratio of labour to human capital 7 ,
. the efficient skill ratio t is then given by 2qr ts1. When the skill ratio is
efficient, bst, no incentives exist to develop new technologies, since unit cost
. of modern and traditional technologies are the same, as can be seen from 10 . I
. The equality determining the efficient skill ratio t,2 q r t s 1, can be
understood when comparing private incentives to study with social gains. An() K. WalderEuropean Journal of Political Economy 16 2000 445–468 ¨ 459
.  . individual will study as long as w ) 2qrw, which follows from 4 . Society HL
. wants an individual to study as long as under the traditional technology the
marginal productivity of a skilled worker exceeds the marginal productivity of an
unskilled worker, Y )Y . When value marginal products equal wages, this latter HL
inequality is equivalent to w )b
y1w . Comparing private incentives with social HL
optimality, the efficient number of skilled will result if 2qrsb
y1, which is the
equation defining the efficient skill ratio t.
When b differs from t, private incentives to study remain unchanged but
social gains from an additional unit of human capital change. Marginal productivi-
ties of human capital and labour will therefore differ in equilibrium and an
incentive to replace factors of production exists. In an elitist education system
where b-t, abilities of skilled workers are too high relative to abilities of
 unskilled workers or, equivalently, education of unskilled workers is of relatively
. too bad quality , there is too much human capital in the economy, human capital is
therefore cheap and will be used to replace labour. Similarly, when the education
system is egalitarian, b)t, there is too much labour and human capital tends to
be replaced by labour. Since under an efficient education system value marginal
products are the same for human capital and labour, no incentives to substitute
between factors of production exist.
 Proposition 2. Introducing the modern high-skill technology and capital intensity
. per job The capital intensity in modern firms is higher than the capital intensity







tr . . . HH H L 01
( Capital intensity is measured by the ratio of capital to number of workers which
) is the easier to obserÍe ratio compared to the capital to human capital ratio .
. . Proof. By 15a with 15b , the capital stock per efficiency unit of human capital
m  mm . tr  tr tr. and labour are equalized across technologies, K r H qH sK r H qL . 01
. mmm . tr  tr tr. By 6b , this is equivalent to K r N qN sK r N qbN . Since b-1 H0 H1 HL
 . . otherwise, 10 would not hold and automation would not take place , the RHS of
tr  tr tr. this equality exceeds K r N qN . HL I
. Proposition 3. Increasing capital intensity The introduction of the modern
high-skill technology increases the capital intensity in traditional firms.
Proof. From the first order condition for capital input in traditional firms Y tr tr sr, K
u  u u. the equilibrium capital stock in traditional firms is given by K sr H qL ,
where r is a constant depending on the interest rate r. Changes in the capital
intensity between period t and period tq1 in a traditional firm are then given by
d u tr u tr u . K r N q N , where K sr N qN solved for K has to be inserted. This HL H L d N H() K. WalderEuropean Journal of Political Economy 16 2000 445–468 ¨ 460
derivative is positive, as long as LrH)b
1r1yu .. By the equilibrium condition
. 7 , this is always the case. I
The effects of modern high-skill technologies on capital intensity can be
understood as follows. Since the capital endowment per job is higher in modern
firms than in traditional firms and the capital intensity in traditional firms rises, the
capital intensity after automation is higher in both types of firms than before
automation. The important aspect of this finding is the difference from increasing
capital intensity due to capital accumulation. In standard growth models, techno-
logical change allows for capital deepening that takes place uniformly across all
firms or workers. Here, technological change leads to a division of firms into
capital-rich firms and capital-poor firms.
When comparing output between a modern and a traditional firm, a given level
of output can be produced with fewer workers when the modern technology is
used, simply because the average worker in a modern firm is more productive than
the average worker in a traditional firm. This captures the idea that ‘‘a task that
required many unskilled some years ago can now be done by one skilled as long
as he or she has the right equipment’’, i.e., the modern high-skill technology.
9
Introducing the modern high-skill technology has been called automation,
which distinguishes this form of technological change from the introduction of
low-skill technologies. The motivation for this name results from
 Proposition 4. Introducing the modern low-skill technology and capital intensity
. per job When the modern low-skill technology is introduced, the capital intensity
m  m of modern firms is lower than the capital intensity of traditional firms, K r NL0
m. tr  tr tr. qN -K r N qN . L1 HL
Proof. An introduction of the modern low-skill technology leads to equalization of
the capital stock per efficiency unit of human capital and labour as was the case
. when automation takes place cf. Proposition 2 . This expression now reads
m  mm . tr  tr tr. K r L qL sK r H qL , where the labour stock in modern firms has 01
replaced the human capital stock in the denominator of the expression of Proposi-















tr . . HL
tr  tr tr. Since b-1, the RHS of this equality is smaller than K r N qN . HL I
9 Note that differences in capital endowment per job and output per worker are not causal to rising
wage differentials, but result from embodied productivity differentials between these groups and the
availability of the modern technology.() K. WalderEuropean Journal of Political Economy 16 2000 445–468 ¨ 461
The expression automation is often associated with a process where a new
generation of firms is more capital intensive and has higher output per worker than
traditional firms, which are partly replaced. Proposition 2 has shown that introduc-
ing modern high-skill technologies leads to a division of firms into more and less
capital intensive firms and implies that the capital intensity of modern firms is
higher than capital intensity of traditional firms. This proposition shows that the
introduction of the modern low-skill technology would not imply that modern
firms are more capital intensive than traditional firms. Hence, the term automation
is appropriate for the process where modern high-skill technologies become
available. The fact that only automation leads to modern firms that are more
capital intensive than traditional firms can be regarded as further support for the
view that automation, in addition to the fact that it predicts observed changes in
relative wages, is empirically more relevant than introduction of modern low-skill
technologies.
. Proposition 5. Winners from automation The labour group operating the new
()  production units skilled workers in this example gain from automation, w tq H
. . 1 ) wt . H
. Proposition 6. Losers from automation Factors of production that are replaced
. . by the modern technology lose through automation, w tq1 -wt . LL
. Proof. When an economy is human capital rich, i.e., when 10 holds, firms will
employ human capital for unskilled jobs as soon as the modern high-skill
technology is available. The stock of human capital working in traditional firms
therefore shrinks. This reduces productivity of labour and physical capital. As a
consequence, physical capital leaves traditional firms as well. This again reduces
productivity of labour. Since labour cannot move to other firms, labour rewards
fall.
Automation takes place when there is too much human capital, i.e., when wages
per efficiency unit of skilled workers are lower than wages per efficiency unit of
. unskilled workers as in 10 . The process of factor flows to modern firms comes to
. an end, when wages per efficiency units are equalized as in 11 . This equalization
implies an increase in wages per efficiency unit of skilled workers. Since wage
income of a skilled worker is proportional to the wage per efficiency unit of a
skilled worker, wage income of skilled workers rises. I
Summarizing, the effect of the relative quality of schooling on induced techno-
logical change and wages is as follows. The relative quality of schooling is given
by b. Assume it lies below the efficient level, i.e., b-t. Individuals base their
education decision on private incentives, which differ from social returns as long
as b differs from t. When b is too low, i.e., when the productivity of graduates() K. WalderEuropean Journal of Political Economy 16 2000 445–468 ¨ 462
from primary and secondary education is low relative to productivity of graduates
from tertiary education, too many individuals decide to work as skilled and the
stock of human capital is socially too large. The marginal product of human
capital is therefore lower than the marginal product of labour and there are social
gains from using human capital in jobs usually performed by labour. Some firms
will perceive these potential gains, will undertake R&D and develop technologies
that allow the replacement of labour by human capital.
Once these modern high-skill technologies are available, producers, when
considering employment for unskilled jobs, compare factor rewards per efficiency
unit to be paid to a skilled worker under the modern technology with factor
rewards per efficiency unit to be paid to an unskilled under the traditional
technology. Since modern technologies allow skilled workers to preserve their
productivity lead, factor rewards per efficiency unit of skilled worker under the
modern technology equal the marginal productivity of human capital. Wages per
efficiency unit of unskilled workers equal the marginal productivity of labour.
Since marginal productivity of human capital is lower than marginal productivity
of labour, firms will adopt the modern technology and replace unskilled workers
by skilled workers. In order to attract skilled workers, modern firms have to offer
wages that lie above wages paid in traditional firms. This raises wages of skilled
workers. Unskilled workers in traditional firms end up working with fewer skilled
workers, which reduces their productivity and their wages. New technologies
therefore lead to changes in the values of skills.
5. Induced technological change and cross-country results
5.1. Induced technological change and rising wage inequality
 Studies of the evolution of the wage distribution in the US e.g., Bound and
. 10 Johnson, 1992; Katz and Murphy, 1992; Juhn et al., 1993 generally conclude
that technological change during the 1980s has reduced demand for unskilled
workers and thereby real labour income of these groups, which has led to an
increase of wage inequality. This conclusion is not easily reconciled with views of
the direction of technological change. Technological change is generally consid-
. ered, at least since Hicks 1932 , as an endogenously determined, ‘‘induced’’
process. Inventions have a tendency to replace a relatively expensive factor of
production by a less expensive one, which could suggest that technological change
10 .  Leamer 1994 finds that technological change favours production workers as opposed to
. non-production workers . But he himself is sceptical about linking this finding to changes in income
inequality, since there is only a weak link from skilled vs. unskilled to non-production vs. production
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could not be a reason of wage inequality at all. Since induced technological
change leads to an increase of demand for relatively cheap factors of production,
the introduction of new technologies should tend to reduce wage inequality.
Labour groups with low earnings, which are relatively cheap compared to other
labour groups, should gain from technological change.
The above analysis has shown that the relevant measure for scarcity of a factor
is the wage rate per efficiency unit and not observed labour earnings. If efficiency
differences between labour groups are high enough, low labour earnings of a
certain group of labour do not imply incentives to increase demand for this group
through new technologies. On the contrary, technological change would reduce
demand for their services and increase wage inequality. A distinction therefore has
to be drawn between cheap in terms of wage levels per efficiency unit, which
determine the direction of technological change, and cheap in terms of observed
wage earnings.
5.2. Cross-country differences in wage inequality
The main difference in the labour market history of the 1970s and 1980s
between the US and Germany is the fairly stable wage structure in Germany and
the rising wage inequality in the US in conjunction with the rising unemployment
rate in Germany and the roughly trendless unemployment rate in the US.
The differences in changing wage structures can now be given the following
interpretation. The schooling system in the US is more elitist than the education
system in Germany. These differences translate into differences in factor endow-
. ment of the economies 7 and differences in incentives to develop new technolo-
. gies. Observing only relative wages as given by 5 , the US and Germany cannot
be distinguished in the original equilibrium. The US skill differentials, however,
induced the development of a technology of production that permitted replacement
of unskilled workers, who were relatively more expensive in efficiency units, by
. skilled workers. This led to the increase in wage inequality in the US, to 11 . The
less elitist education system in Germany led to a factor endowment that did not
necessitate the development of technologies that replace unskilled by skilled
. workers. Relative wages in Germany therefore remained unchanged at 5 . Tech-
nological change was skill-biased in the US but not skill-biased in Germany.
Given this interpretation, some qualifications are required with respect to the
development of new technologies. A literal interpretation of the above model
would mean that new technologies were adopted only in the US but not in
Germany. This is certainly not true, neither would one expect this. Incentives to
develop new technologies do not only result from gains from replacing factors of
production, but also from increasing total factor productivity as stressed in recent
 models of growth Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and
. Howitt, 1992; cf. also Walde, 1999 . It is well known that labour productivity in ¨
the US is higher than in other G7 countries but that labour productivity of these() K. WalderEuropean Journal of Political Economy 16 2000 445–468 ¨ 464
countries converges. One should therefore expect that new technologies are
introduced in the US earlier than elsewhere but that, basically, technologies are the
same. That is, computers are used in Germany as well. This is what was found by
. DiNardo and Pischke 1997, Table I . The percentage of workers using a computer
was 37.4 in the US in 1989 and 35.3 in Germany in 1991–1992. Comparing
 France a country with an equally stable wage distribution as Germany and with
. an education system that is closer to the German system than to the US system
. and the US, Card et al. 1996, Table 1 also find close similarities in overall usage
. rates 34.0% for France in 1991 . The main difference in induced technology
change between the US and Germany does therefore not lie in the use of new
technologies but in how these technologies are used. Proposition 2 provides a
precise prediction how this difference can be detected. In the US, one should find
a segregation of the economy into unskilled firms with a low capital per worker
 ratio and skilled firms with a high capital per worker ratio ‘‘McDonald’s vs.
. Microsoft’’ whereas in Germany, this distinction should be less pronounced.
Some first evidence that supports this view also comes from DiNardo and
. . Pischke 1997, Table 1 and Card et al. 1996, Table 1 : computers per unskilled
. worker the percentage of unskilled workers that use a computer relative to
computers per skilled workers is higher in Germany and in France than in the US.
The computer usage ratio of high school to college graduates was 0.48 in the US
. 11 in 1989 computed from DiNardo and Pischke, 1997, Table 1 , 0.53 in Germany
. 12 in 1991–1992 and 0.73 in France.
6. Conclusion
This paper has shown that countries that differ in their education systems differ
in the direction of technological change. In a country where the skill ratio of
graduates from tertiary education to graduates from secondary education is large,
there are incentives to develop and adopt technologies that allow replacement of
.  unskilled graduates from secondary education by skilled workers graduates from
. tertiary education . These incentives do not exist in countries with a more equal
11 This ratio would even be higher for Germany relative to the US if workers with an education level
‘less than high school’ and ‘some college’ were added to the group of high school graduates. A note of
care is in order, however, since education levels are not directly comparable across countries. We
therefore consider this to be only first supportive evidence and more evidence is needed on this point. I
am grateful to Steve Pischke for discussions related to these aspects.
12 It is sometimes argued that the increase in wage inequality in the US corresponds to the increase in
 unemployment in Germany. Apart from empirical evidence against this view Nickell and Bell, 1996;
. Card et al., 1996 , the present paper predicts that even if wages were downward rigid in Germany
. assume wL in the model cannot fall there would not have been an increase in unemployment due to
biased technological change as there was no biased technological change in Germany and therefore no
downward pressure on wages.() K. WalderEuropean Journal of Political Economy 16 2000 445–468 ¨ 465
skill ratio between skilled and unskilled workers. The skill bias in technological
change is therefore predicted to crucially depend on the education system. In the
US, new technologies have led to replacement of unskilled by skilled workers,
which caused an increase in wage inequality. In Germany, new technologies were
adopted by all skill groups, and therefore did not change the wage structure. The
rising unemployment rates in Germany therefore require an explanation other than
skill-biased technological change.
From a theoretical point of view, the paper introduces a novel form of
technological change. The introduction of a modern high-skill technology is
assumed to allow replacement of unskilled workers by skilled workers without a
loss in productivity of skilled workers. Skilled workers perform the same tasks as
unskilled workers but — due to the new technology — can use their skills
acquired during education to perform these tasks more quickly. The analogy is the
introduction of a modern low-skill technology that allows replacement of skilled
workers by unskilled workers where the productivity differential also prevails. The
productivity differential between labour groups is a central determinant of relative
wages per efficiency unit. Since wages per efficiency unit are the measure that
determines which factor of production will be replaced, the direction of technolog-
ical change and implied changes in relative wages depend on relative productivi-
ties and — since relative productivities are assumed to depend on the education
system — on the relative quality of education.
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Appendix
() () A.1. DeriÍing equilibrium properties 14a – 15b
 In equilibrium, capital must pay equal returns in both technologies which,
. given arbitrage possibilities, equals an internationally given interest rate r .() K. WalderEuropean Journal of Political Economy 16 2000 445–468 ¨ 466
Human capital earns same income whether employed for managerial purposes in a
traditional or in a modern firm or whether working in the production process,
Y m m sY tr tr , Y m m sY tr tr , is0,1. 17 . KKHH i






msH,1 8 . 01
where K is the capital stock in the economy under free international capital
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s .2 1 . m tr K K
. Substituting into 19 shows
H
m L 2
s .2 2 . m tr K K
. m . By deriving an analogous equation to 20 for H , and dividing it by 20 gives 2
H
msH
m,2 3 . 12
which is clear from looking at the symmetry property of the automation technol-
 . . . . tr ogy 5 . Dividing 21 by 22 using 23 gives H sL. Since the number of
skilled workers is the same in both production activities in the modern technology
. . 23 and because of the factor market clearing condition for human capital 18 ,
the number of skilled workers using the modern technology is simply
H
msHyL.2 4 .
. m We now compute the allocation of capital K. Solving 22 for K ,b y
. mm  employing the capital market clearing condition 18 gives H rK sLr Ky 2
m. m m. mm m mmm  m . K m HK y Ks HK y HKs KL m HK s KL q H. Since 22 2 2 2
1
H y L . 1 2 mm . .  . by 23 and 24 H s HyL , we find K s K 2 1 2
Lq HyL . / 2
H y L
tr  . . s K . Consequently, K s 2Lr HqLK .
H q L() K. WalderEuropean Journal of Political Economy 16 2000 445–468 ¨ 467
() A.2. DeriÍing the aggregate technology 16
1ru 1ru uu 2 L 2 K
tr uu YK q L q L sq 2 L , /  / /  / H q LH q L
1 r u u K
m1 y u Y sq 2 H y L . / / H q L
1 r u uu 12 K
1 y u sq 2 H y L . /  / / 2 H q L
1 r u uu 1 r u 12 K 1
u u 1 y u s 2 q 2 P 2 H y L . u /  / / / 2 H q L 2
1 r u u 2 KH y L
sq 2. / / H q L 2
Therefore,
1ru u 2KH q L 1 r u u u 1 y u Y sq 2 s K q 2 H q L . . . / / H q L 2
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